Friday, February 8, 2019

The Italian Tragedy

Towards the end of 2018, Italy slipped into a (technical) recession. Italy's GDP growth was -0.2% in Q4 [1]. For several years now, Italy's economic position has been in a very fragile state. At present, its country's debt to GDP ratio stands at 132%. Although one measure makes the situation warrant concern, more worrisome is how the country has attempted to deal with the lofty sum.

Since 2015, the ECB has executed a QE program encouraging member central banks to purchase their own country's debt in proportion to the size of the country. In some cases, this has led to triangular transactions, in which the foreign sellers of Italian bonds will ask the ECB to credit the payment orders [2]. So, the Bundesbank has to credit not only the direct payment orders from the Italian government but also in the indirect orders resulting in the Bank of Italy's repurchases in third countries. Because of these transactions, the ECB has been the biggest buyer of Italian government debt. On behalf of the ECB, the Bank of Italy has bought more than $350 billion of multi-year treasury bonds since May 2015 [3]. The proportion of Italian gov. bonds held by the Bank of Italy since 2015 has grown from 5.8% of total outstanding debt to 19.3% [4]. The country itself has the highest proportion of debt held by residents and the lowest proportion held by foreigners.

Large foreign banking investors and institutions have continued to shed close to $69 billion (net) of Italian government debt. Since June 2019, capital flows have recovered somewhat [5]. Foreign direct investment, has also shown signs of substantial weakness since then [6]. The BTP 10-year spreads have been above 200 basis points for several months now, which (according to one source) can have spill-over effects into other EMU sovereigns [7]. Sharp moves in that spread, say an increase by 100 basis points, reduces the Common Equity Tier 1 capital of Italy's two largest banks by 35 basis points. The impact is nearly twice as large for mid-sized banks. Already we're beginning to see how fragile the Italian banking system is. Banca Carige recently received a $400 million emergency injection of cash to stay afloat after declaring bankruptcy [8].



Italy Capital Flows
Source: https://tradingeconomics.com/italy/capital-flows



Italy Foreign Direct Investment
Source: https://tradingeconomics.com/italy/foreign-direct-investment

A leading indicator of Italy's impending debt crisis can be observed through CDS spreads [9]. In 2015, ISDA introduced a new CDS contract to protect against euro area countries redenominating their debt into new national currencies. The spread between the new contract, and the old contract (2003) shows the potential for depreciation in the event of a redenomination. The only way that doesn't trigger a credit even is if Italy's debt is redenominated into a reserve currency, such as USD, CAD, the British pound, the yen, or the Swiss franc.


Source: https://ihsmarkit.com/research-analysis/cds-redenomination.html

As of February 7th, 2019, Italy's 5-year CDS rose to 232 basis point, UniCredit's 5-year CDS to 169 basis points, and Intesa Sanpaolo's 5-year CDS to 178 basis points [10].

If and when the debt crisis does play out, some economists at the Bundesbank have advocated for a national fund. The fund would be financed through "solidarity bonds" that Italian households would be forced to purchase according to a fixed proportion of their net wealth. As bleak as this may seem, it highlights the ignorance of economists refusing to acknowledge the problem itself: a common currency system within a network of nations who have vastly different fiscal and political systems.

With that, I'd like to end with two quotes from Friedrich Hayek's wonderful book, The Road to Serfdom:

"We are ready to accept almost any explanation of the present crisis of our civilization except one: that the present state of the world may be the result of genuine error on our part and that the pursuit of some of our most cherished ideals has apparently produced results utterly different from those which we expected."

"Only if we understand why and how certain kinds of economic controls tend to paralyze the driving forces of a free society, and which kinds of measures are particularly dangerous in this respect, can we hope that social experimentation will not lead us into situations none of us want."

Sources:
[1] https://www.zerohedge.com/news/2019-01-31/italy-officially-slides-recession-after-budget-battle-brussels
[2] https://moneymaven.io/mishtalk/economics/target2-and-secret-bailouts-will-germany-be-forced-into-a-fiscal-union-with-rest-of-eurozone-gkc4UP17RUyDbKp1LxkBfg/
[3] https://wolfstreet.com/2018/11/22/qe-created-dangerous-financial-dependence-italy-hooked-withdrawal-next-ecb-warns/
[4] http://bruegel.org/2018/11/the-consequences-of-italys-increasing-dependence-on-domestic-debt-holders/
[5] https://tradingeconomics.com/italy/capital-flows
[6] https://tradingeconomics.com/italy/foreign-direct-investment
[7] https://www.socialeurope.eu/italy-and-the-new-eurozone-risk-morphology
[8] https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/02/reuters-america-update-2-ecb-appointed-administrators-step-in-to-manage-italys-banca-carige.html
[9] https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2017/03/06/2185614/guest-post-cds-markets-signal-rising-fear-of-euro-breakup/
[10] https://finance.yahoo.com/news/italian-sovereign-bank-cds-jump-155413997.html?.tsrc=rss

Friday, February 1, 2019

The Fed's Trouble with Leverage


QT is coming to end after a very short run. Since 2017, the Fed was attempting to "wind down" its massively bloated balance sheet of worthless mortgage securities and monetized debt (Treasuries) from the last financial crisis. While the truth was long overdue, in a recent WSJ article [1], Lorie Logan, an executive at the NY Fed, finally admitted last May that she saw, "virtually no change of going back to the pre-crisis balance sheet size." Unfortunately, what this means is that with an end to QT, there will be an inevitable transition to QE.

Even more troublesome is looking at what's already on the Fed's balance sheet. On first glance at the balance sheet as of Jan. 16th, 2019 [2], the Federal Reserve has a leverage ratio of approximately 103:1 (total assets: total capital). However, the real problems are swept under the footnote rug. An article by Alex Pollock [3] delves into the Fed's accounting rules, and sheds light on some financial shenanigans. Supplemental Information #2 in the Sep. 30th, 2018 financials [4] shows information on "System Open Market Account Holdings," In other words, these are the securities that the Fed purchased after 2008 as part of the QE programs.

It writes: "Treasury securities, government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) debt securities, and federal agency and GSE mortgage-backed securities (MBS) are reported at amortized cost in the Combined statements of condition." (emphasis mine)

First of all, is it allowed? According to rules from 1931 and 1992, it is. In 1931, it was allowed that banks could value certain "investment-grade bonds" at "intrinsic value" instead of at market. This allowed for other methods which were deemed more appropriate at coming to the real value of the securities, where the market would mark them too low. A government accounting rule enacted in 1992 pertaining specifically to real-estate related assets, extended the old rule, allowing their net worth to be valued by their "intrinsic value" as well. Unfortunately, it is also permitted that a government and the Fed can make up their own accounting rules.

It is important to point out that amortized cost is not the same as mark-to-market. Mark-to-market method is much more conservative, and if there are losses in these securities, it underestimates the number. As it happens, the Fed does have unrealized losses on those QE-purchased securities. Contrary to what economists and mainstream media practitioners say, those securities are indeed worthless.

Moving onto the table below the footnote, it shows just how big these losses are, at amortized cost. While the cumulative unrealized losses on Treasury Securities notes are approximately $27.76 billions dollars (as of 9 months ended, 2018), but the total Treasury Securities unrealized loss is only $770 million. Meanwhile you also have to factor in the other row: the total cumulative unrealized losses on Federal agency and GSE MBS are $66.453 billion.

And what's paid in capital again? As of Jan. 16th, 2019, the total capital paid-in is $32 billion. 
According to Mr. Pollock from an interview in the Grant's Pub Podcast [5], the Fed can raise another $32 billion from shareholders. That is, from commercial banks who are members of the Federal Reserve.

But, it's still not enough. How will the Fed cover the rest of the losses? With interest rates rising, the unrealized losses will grow bigger, and the Fed's net worth will be more negative. As noted earlier, there is a strong probability that the Fed will attempt QE yet again to reverse the losses.

Since I do not claim to be a forecaster, I will invoke Mark Twain on this one: History seldom repeats, but it does rhyme. This is to say that this instance of financial shenanigans is quite reminiscent of the 1980s savings and loans crisis. Readers of history are all too aware of the ending in that story…

Sources:
[1] https://www.wsj.com/articles/fed-officials-weigh-earlier-than-expected-end-to-bond-portfolio-runoff-11548412201
[2] https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/current/h41.htm#h41tab1
[3] https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/the-fed-is-technically-insolvent-should-anybody-care
[4] https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/2018-september-federal-reserve-banks-combined-quarterly-financial-report-unaudited.htm
[5] https://www.grantspub.com/podcasts.cfm?podcastform=2